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Summary findings
Exploiting a unique data set containing information  point increase in the bribery rate is associated with a
about the estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms,  three percentage point reduction in firm growth-an
Fisman and Svensson study the relationship between  effect about three times that of taxation.
bribe payments, taxes, and firm growth  in Uganda for  Moreover, after excluding outliers, the authors find
the period 1995-97.  that bribery has a much greater negative impact on
Using industry-location averages to circumvent the  growth, and taxation  a considerably smaller one.
potential problem of endogeneity and to deal with issues  This provides some validation of firm-level theories of
of measurement error, they find that both the rate of  corruption,  which posit that corruption retards
taxation  and the rate of bribery are negatively correlated  development even more than taxation  does.
with firm growth. For the full data set, a one percentage
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The debate on the effect of corruption on economic growth has been a hotly contested
issue for several decades. Often, the effect of corruption is thought of as being something
like a tax, differing primarily in that the payment does not end up as public revenues.'  To
the extent that this deprives the government of revenue required to provide productive
public  goods,  corruption may  be  more  detrimental to  growth than  taxation.  More
recently,  Sheifer  and  Vishny  (1993) have  argued  that  corruption  may  be  far  more
damaging  than  taxation,  because  of  the  uncertainty  and  secrecy  that  necessarily
accompany bribery  paymnents. On the other side, proponents of  'efficient corruption'
claim  that  bribery  may  allow  firms to  get  things  done  in  an  economy  plagued  by
bureaucratic holdups. 2 Moreover, it has also been argued that a system built on bribery
will lead to an efficient process for allocating licenses and government contracts, since
the most efficient firms will be able to afford to pay the highest bribes (see Lui, 1985).
Hence, the issue of whether bribery is more harmful than taxation, or if, in fact,
corruption  is  damaging at  all,  is primarily  an  empirical question.  The  relationship
between growth and corruption has been examined extensively in the macro literature,
beginning  with  Mauro  (1995).  In  general, these  studies  find  a  negative  correlation
between  corruption and GDP  growth.  On the  issue  of taxation versus bribery, Wei
(1997)  finds  that  bribery  has  a  much  stronger  negative  impact  on  foreign  direct
l See  Johnson,  Kaufmnann,  & Shleifer  (1998)  on the  public  finance  aspect  of corruption,  and  Bardhan
(1997),  Tanzi  (1998),  and  Wei  (1999)  for  reviews  of existing  literature.
2 See the discussion in Bardhan (1997). Kaufmnann  and Wei (1998) provide some indirect evidence in line
with Myrdal's  (1968) argument that corrupt officials may instead of speeding up, actually cause
administrative delays in order to attract more bribes. See also Banerjee (1997).
2investment than taxation.  This body of work is based entirely on cross-country analyses,
however, which always raises serious concerns about unobserved heterogeneity across
data points.  Moreover, the data on corruption is based on perception indexes, typically
constructed from experts'  assessments of overall corruption  in  a  country, raising  an
additional  concern  about perception  biases.  Finally,  the  cross-country  work  on  the
relationship between corruption and growth tells us little about the effect of corruption on
individual finrs: for example, the negative relationship between growth and corruption at
the country level may derive from an inefficient provision of public goods.  If this were
the case, corruption would not be damaging for the reasons cited by Shleifer and Vishny,
and others that focus on firm-level theories of corruption.
In this paper, we take advantage of a unique data set that contains information on
the estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms.  We find that there is a (weak) negative
relationship between bribery payments and firm growth over the period 1995-97.  After
noting the potential problems of endogeneity and measurement error, we  look at the
relationship between firm growth and bribe payments, using industry-location averages
as instruments, and find that the negative effect is considerably stronger.  For the full data
set, a one percentage point increase in the bribery rate (as defined by bribe payments
divided by  sales)  is associated with  a  reduction in  firm  growth of more  than  three
percentage  points,  an  effect  that  is  about  2.5  times  greater  than  that  of  taxation.
Moreover, after outliers are excluded, we find a much greater negative impact of bribery
on growth, while the effect of taxation is considerably attenuated.  This provides some
validation for firn-level  theories of corruption which posit that corruption retards  the
development process to a greater extent than taxation.
3The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in Section II, we will describe the
specification that  we  intend to  use  to  examine the  relationship  between  growth and
corruption.  Section III  describes the data, including details  of how  our data on bribe
payments were  collected.  The  results  are given  in  Section  IV.  Finally,  Section  V
concludes.
II. Empirical Strategy
There are two main econometric issues of assessing whether corruption will have
a significant retarding effect on growth: (i) problems due to measurement errors, and (ii)
the fact that both growth and corruption are likely to be jointly determined. Below we
discuss how we attempt to deal with these issues.
If bureaucrats can customize the nature and amount of harassment on firms to
extract bribes, the "required bribe" will depend on the firm's willingness/ability to pay.
Two firms in the same sector may thus need to pay different amounts in bribes, and the
difference may be correlated with (unobservable) features influencing the growth
trajectory of the firms. A simple example illustrates the point. Consider two firms in a
given sector of similar size and age, which are located in the same region. One of the
firms is producing a good/brand that is perceived to have a very favorable demand
forecast, while the other firm is producing a good with much less favorable demand
growth. Assume furthermore that the firms need to clear a certain number of business
regulations and licensing requirements, and/or require some public infrastructure
4services; moreover, assume that the bureaucrats have discretion in implementing and
enforcing these regulations and services. A rational and profit maximizing bureaucrat
would try to extract as high a bribe as possible, subject to the constraints that the firm
might exit, and/or the bureaucrat may get caught. In this setup we would expect a
bureaucrat to demand higher bribes from the firm producing the good with a favorable
demand forecast, simply because this firm's expected profit are higher and, thus, its
ability to pay larger. If the forecasts also influence the firms' willingness to invest and
expand, we would expect (comparing these two firrns) a positive (observed) relationship
between corruption and growth. 3
A second problem of endogeneity arises if firms may specialize in rent-seeking or
efficiency as a means of growth.  Some elements of bribery are likely to be relatively
fixed across firms within a given industry, for example, the unofficial cost to being
hooked up to the government power grid; paying off the local labor inspector; getting a
telephone line installed.  However, it is possible that firms may differentially choose to
devote resources to obtaining valuable licenses, preferential market access, and so forth.
Thus, some firms choose to compete based on costly preferential bureaucratic access,
while others focus on improving productivity and investing in new capital (see for
example Murphy et al., 1991). Both strategies may lead to growth, and in equilibrium, it
is not clear that either firm type will grow more rapidly.  This effect will tend to attenuate
any measured effect between bribery and growth.
The preceding  difficulties  will  tend  to  mask  any  direct  negative  effect  that
corruption has on growth.  These problems may be mitigated by instrumenting for bribes.
3 See Bliss & Di Tella (1997), for a more detailed theoretical analysis of these issues. Svensson (1999)
provides evidence in line with this argument.
5Our identification strategy can be laid out formally with minimal notational complexity
by initially disregarding the relationship between growth and taxation. We can then state
the relationship between firm growth (yij)  and corruption (bij)  as:
Yjj  = r(bj(9ij),  Py,Oij)  (1)
where subscripts refers to firn  i in sectorj.  In (1), Ov  is a firm-specific (unobservable)
factor that may impact both bribery rates and firm growth, pi  is a variable capturing the
firm's growth potential. The firm's growth potential can be decomposed into two parts,
Pij = X',,  + 77Y  (2)
where Xy is a vector of observable characteristics, and 77  is a zero-mean error term.
Linearising the model yields,
r, =Io +  /bb,  q+X,jy6 +/ 3 90j  +  1 (3)
Our previous  discussion implies that the  omitted variable Oj is correlated  with  both
growth (,Bo  ,  0) and bribery (corr(b,0)#0). In line with the discussion in the introduction,
we assume that Po>O  and corr(b,O)>0.  For example, we can think of the shifts in demand
described  above  that  is likely  to  influence  both  the  "required"  bribe  and  growth. 4
Assuming, for simplicity, that 0 is essentially uncorrelated with X, this leads to the usual
omitted variable bias; given our assumptions, the bias will be towards zero, resulting in
an underestimate of the effects of bribery.
6Following the  discussion  above,  our  identifying assumption to  deal with  this
problem is that bij  can be decomposed into two terms, one industry-specific, and the other
particular to the firm:
bi)  =B,, + B,  (4)
In (4), B. denotes the (average) amount of bribes common to industry-locationj,  which in
turn is a  function of the underlying characteristics inherent to that particular industry-
location, deternining  to what extent bureaucrats can extract bribes, while Bij denotes the
idiosyncratic component.  More importantly, since we assume that the industry-specific
part of bribery is determined by underlying technologies and the rent-extraction talents
and inclinations of bureaucrats, we assume that this component is exogenous to the firm,
and hence uncorrelated with 0.  For example, such industry-specific factors might include
the extent to which the market for the produced  goods is abroad,  import reliance, and
dependence  of  publicly  provided  infrastructure  services.  Likewise,  we  expect  rent
extraction through bribery to  differ across locations simply because  some bureaucrats
may be more effective at extracting bribes than others.  If this  assumption is valid, we
may  use  B.  to  instrument for  by,, since  corr(Bj,O)=O. In such  a  specification,  using
industry-location averages as an instrument for  firm-level bribery  gets rid of the bias
resulting from unobservables that are correlated with bribery at the firm, but not industry-
location, level. Note that it is plausible that the same types of effects could potentially be
at work at the industry level: bureaucrats could choose to victimize industries with high
growth potential,  thereby  attenuating  any  relationship  between  growth and  industry-
4The  model could equivalently be framed in terms of simultaneously determined bribery rates and growth,
7location bribery averages.  Note, however, that these effects only work against our
finding  any effect. Thus,  the IV-technique  we employ  is likely to provide  a lower bound
(in absolute  terms)  of the effect  of bribery  on growth.
The other  significant  estimation  issue that we wish to address  is the extent and
impact  of "noisy"  data, which  is a common  concern  when  using  micro-level  data. Despite
our data collection  strategy  outlined  below,  measurement  errors,  in particular  in the bribe
data,  are likely  to be of concern,  simply  because  of the secretive  nature of these  data.
Using  grouped  averages  as instruments  to deal with measurement  error is a common
technique.5  In our case, the industry-location  averages  we use should  serve  to mitigate
the effects  of measurement  error, since  we generally  think of these  errors  as being largely
idiosyncratic  to the firm,  and hence  uncorrelated  with the average  bribery  values.
In a country  such  as Uganda,  where  tax authorities  have a high degree of
discretion  (see Chen and Reinikka,  1999),  we might  expect  that the relationship  between
effective  tax rates  (t) a firm  needs  to pay and growth  to be influenced  by the same  types
of mechanisms.  A rational  tax collector  (who  may  also be corrupt)  can levy  higher  taxes
on a firm  with higher  current  or expected  future  profits,  and the firm (given  expectations
of high future  profits) may  also be more willing  to comply.  Similarly,  a firm  may
specialize  in evading  taxes and colluding  with the tax collector,  or improving
productivity.
leading  to a simultaneity  bias from OLS.
5  See Wald  (1940)  for  the original  contribution.
8Thus our empirical model is,
)  = i&  + 6bbl  + fliVs  + X}  + i,  ,  (5)
where biNs  and  ljNS  are the fitted values from the first stage regressions, using location-
industry averages of b and  r as instruments, and including the same vector of controls X
as covariates.
III. Data
All data used in the paper is from the Ugandan Industrial Enterprise Survey (see
Reinikka and Svensson, 1999 for details). This survey was initiated by the World Bank
primarily to collect data on the constraints facing private enterprises in Uganda, and was
implemented during the period January-June 1998. A total of 243 firms were interviewed
in 5 locations, in 14 different industries.
Of primary concem is the issue of whether reliable data on corruption may be
collected.  For a long time it has been the common view that, given the secretive nature
of corrupt activities, it would be virtually impossible to collect reliable quantitative
information on corruption. However, Kaufmann (1997) and others have argued forcefully
against this presumption. With appropriate survey methods and interview techniques firm
managers are willing to discuss corruption with remarkable candor.
9The empirical strategy utilized to collect information on bribe payments across
firms in Uganda had the following six key components. First, the survey was
implemented by an industry association (UMACIS). In Uganda, as in many other
developing (and developed) countries, there is a rooted general distrust of the public
sector. To avoid suspicion of the overall objective of the data collection effort it was
therefore decided that a body that most firms had confidence in should implement the
survey. Second, the corruption related questions (and the whole survey instrument) were
carefully piloted and built on existing surveys on regulatory constraints. Third, the
enumerators were trained by survey experts. Fourth, the questions on corruption were
phrased in an indirect fashion to avoid implicating the respondent of wrongdoing. 6 Fifth,
the corruption related questions were asked at the end of the interview, giving the
enumerator time to establish necessary credibility and trust. Sixth, to enhance the
reliability of the corruption data, multiple questions on corruption were asked (in
different sections of the questionnaire). The survey instrument had roughly 500 entries,
and a handful of them were related to corruption. Finally, the data collection effort was
also aided by the fact that corruption to a large extent has been desensitized in Uganda.
During the mid 1990s, several awareness-raising campaigns were implemented to
emphasize the consequences of corruption, and by the time the survey took place, the
media was regularly reporting on corruption-cases (See Uganda National Integrity
Survey, 1998; Fighting Corruption in Uganda, 1998).
6For  example,  the key question  on bribe  payments  were reported  under  the following  question,  "Many
business  people  have  told us that firms are often  required  to make  informal  payments  to public officials  to
deal with  customs,  taxes, licenses,  regulations,  services,  etc. Can you estimate  what a firm in your line of
business  and of similar  size  and characteristics  typically  pays each year?"
10176 firms, out of 243 sampled, responded to the question on bribery. Of the 67
firms that did not respond to the corruption question, about one third refused to answer
other sensitive questions in the questionnaire; for example about costs and sales. As a
group, the 46 firms that declined to answer questions about corruption in particular did
not differ significantly with respect to size, profits, and location from the group of firms
that gave answers to corruption-related questions. Thus, there is no (observable) evidence
that the sample is not representative.
The reported bribe payments are highly correlated with other (indirect) measures
of corruption, thus significantly enhancing our confidence in the reliability of the bribe
data. The respondents were asked of the total costs (including informal payments) of
getting connected to the public grid and acquiring a telephone line. As discussed in
Svensson (2000), controlling for location (with respect to public grid), these are services
that ex ante one would expect firms to pay the same amount for. Thus, deviations from
the given price typically reflect graft. Of the 25 firms that had been connected to the
public grid over the past three years, all reported positive bribe payments. The partial
correlation (controlling for location) between connection costs and bribes is 0.67. The
pattern is similar for deviations from the fixed price of telephone connection. Of those 77
firms that reported positive deviations, 15 did not report bribe data. The simple
correlation between the excess price of telephone connection and reported bribe payment
for the remaining firms is 0.41.
Obviously, when studying the relationship between bribes and growth it is
necessary to somehow scale the level of bribe payments.  The most natural approach
11would be to look at bribes as a fraction of profits.  This, however, would require perhaps
excessive confidence in the abilities of Ugandan firms to produce accounts that adhere to
some uniform standard.  Instead, we deflate using firm sales, a figure that is much less
prone to manipulation and misreporting.  Thus, our measure of bribery is given by
BRIBE=(bribe payments)/sales.  Similarly, we measure tax rates by looking at taxes as a
fraction of sales (TAX).  Unfortunately, we only have bribery data for 1997; hence, both
of these variables are calculated using data from that year.  Two firms reported bribery
rates in excess of 50 percent, while one firm reported a tax rate of more than 50 percent.
Given that these values far exceed those reported by all other firms, we believe that these
observations are the result of gross misreporting or erroneous recording of data and they
are therefore dropped from the sample.
As our measure of firm growth, we use historical sales data, which was collected
for 1995 and 1996.7 To calculate a rate of growth, we use
GROWTH  = [log(Sales in 1997) - log(Sales in 1995)]/2
Ideally, we would look at growth over a longer time horizon; our definition here is
dictated by data limitations.
Since firm size may be correlated with bribe payments (as larger organizations are
more visible to bureaucrats) and since size may also affect future growth, we include
log(Sales in 1995) as a control (LSALES95).  Similarly, we include the log of the firm's
age (LAGE), which has been found to be correlated with growth in many firm-level
12studies, and may be correlated with bribes if longer established firms have better access
to both bank finance and official contacts. Firms involved in trade, either exporting or
importing, may be more vulnerable for rent extraction and subject to greater bureaucratic
scrutiny and regulation than firms with only local sales. Since a correlation between
growth and trade has been reported in many studies, this will also be an important
control. Hence, we include a dummy variable denoting whether a firm either exports or
imports directly (TRADE).  Finally, we include a variable denoting percent of foreign
ownership (FOREIGN). Such firms may grow more quickly due to greater resources,
access to markets, and technical expertise, while they may be exempt from bureaucratic
harassment as an inducement to locate their operations in Uganda. 8
Summary statistics and a correlation matrix for the basic variables are listed in
Table 1.
IV. Estimation
As a benchmark we ran several regressions without controlling for the endogeneity and
measurement biases. The results, allowing for a number of specifications, are listed in
Table 2. As this Table indicates, there is only a weak association between rates of bribery
and growth in firm sales (t-statistic is -1.38).  Note, however, as discussed above, there
are econometric problems that almost surely bias these coefficients toward zero.  This is
particularly true with respect to BRIBE.
7 We obtained  virtually  identical  results  by using growth  rates of firm profits  and employment.
13Controlling  for foreign ownership, there is a statistically  stronger relationship
between  taxation and growth. 9 The coefficient  on TAX implies that a one-percentage
point  increase  in the rate of taxation  will reduce a firm's  annual growth  rate by about  0.5
percentage  points.
To address  the possible  endogeneity  and measurement  error biases, we instrument
for bribery  and taxation  rates  using location-industry  averages  as instrument. The results
from the IV-estimations,  listed in Table 3, provide support  for the hypothesis  that both
bribery  and taxation  have  a retarding  effect on growth. More  precisely,  the coefficient  on
BRJBEIV takes on values of about  3.5. This implies that a one-percentage  point increase
in the rate of "required"  bribe payments  will reduce a firm's annual growth  rate by about
3.5 percentage points.  The coefficient on  TAX7V  is approximately 1.5, implying
approximately  a 1.5 percentage  point decline in annual growth from a one-percentage
point increase in tax rates. Thus, consistent with both theoretical and cross-country
evidence,  corruption  has a stronger  negative  impact  on growth  than taxation.
Note, however, that average bribery  rates are lower than average tax rates - the
mean and standard  deviation  for BRIBEIV are 0.012 and 0.012 respectively. Analogous
statistics  for TAXIVare 0.085 and 0.046. Thus,  a firm in an industry  at the 1 0th percentile
of  bribery rates (BRIBEIV  of approximately  zero) will have a  growth rate of  8.5
percentage  points lower than a firm at the 90th percentile  (BRIBEIV = 0.023). A shift
from the 10th percentile  of TAXIV  (0.03) to the 90th percentile  (0.14) will be related to a
reduction  in growth  rate of 14.5  percentage  points. So, taxation  may  have a larger impact
sAlternatively,  one could easily imagine that foreign firms would be required to pay higher bribes since, as
newcomers to the Ugandan market they lack appropriate government connections.
14on growth than bribery, simply because tax rates are so much higher; however, on a per
unit basis, these results suggest that bribery is much more damaging.
Robustness
Until now, we have  taken an extremely conservative approach with respect to
outliers: only three observations, which seem quite clearly to be a result of misreporting,
have been dropped.  However, some fairly  serious outliers remain  in the  sample.  In
particular, there are four firms with changes in log sales of more than two, and one firm
with a bribery rate of 0.2 (the second-highest value is 0. 11). While there is no theoretical
justification for deleting these observations, it would be of considerable concern if our
results were completely driven by them. To examine this possibility, we determine the
multivariate outliers  for the three variables GROWTH, BRIBE, and TAX according to
the method  of  Hadi (1994);  similarly,  multivariate outliers  were  determined for  the
second stage of the IV estimation.  A total of 9 observations were flagged as outliers for
specification (3) in Table 2, and 4 outliers were identified for specification (3) in Table 3.
Our analyses were repeated for both specifications, with these outliers excluded.
The results,  listed in  Table 4, imply that  the outlying observations  were pushing  the
measured  effect  of  bribery  towards  zero  in  both  specifications:  excluding  outliers
increases the coefficient on bribery rates by a factor of 5 in specification (1), and doubles
the coefficient in the IV specification. By contrast, the growth-reducing effect of taxation
suggested by the coefficient on both TAX in Table 2 and the instrumented tax rates in
Table 3 seem to derive partly from a small number of extreme observations.  Hence, the
9 Holding other determinants constant, foreign firms on average pay higher taxes and grow faster.
15effect of bribery increases substantially  when a  small number of  rather dubious
observations  are  omitted,  while  the effect  of taxation  lowers.
Note also that these estimates  imply that bribery is more damaging  on growth
than  taxation  both on the margin  and measured  as total impact.
Sheifer and Vishny (1993), Wei (1997) and others have argued that it is the
element  of uncertainty  in bribery  payments  that is particularly  damaging. If this were the
case, then the relevant independent  variable would be  the variance of  BRIBE, as
perceived  by an individual firn.  However, the correlation  between the average of
BRIBE  and the variance  of BRIBE,  taken at the industry  level'°, is 0.83, raising  concerns
of collinearity.  In fact, when each such  variable  is used separately,  they produce  similar
results;  when  both are included,  neither  is significant,  presumably  because  of problems  of
multicollinearity. Note that parallel results exist for the taxation variables, where
problems  surrounding  uncertainty  are  expected  to be lower.
We experimented  with several other potential explanatory  variables, including
measures  of competition  (number of main competitors,  market share), human capital
proxies of  the  owner/manager  (higher education, years  of  previous experience,
experience  of working  abroad),  and structural  features  (distance  to the capital).  However,
including  any one of these  variables  in the growth  equation  did not significantly  affect  the
relationship  between  corruption  and growth.
0  There are not enough observations in each cell at the location-industry level to examine variances.
16V. Conclusion
We have shown that there is a strong, robust, and negative relationship between bribery
rates and the short-run growth rates of Ugandan firms, and that the effect is much larger
than the retarding effect of taxation.  To our knowledge, this provides the first micro-
level support for firm-based theories on  the effects of corruption that have generated
much attention in recent years.  Much more work is still required in this area: ideally, our
data would cover a much longer time horizon, and allow for a finer differentiation among
theories of corruption. Currently, efforts are underway to compile these data.
The results of this paper also have significant policy implications.  The donor
community, and other organizations, have focused increasing attention on  looking for
ways to combat corruption in developing and transition countries.  Our results suggest
that such attention is justified by the data. Corruption significantly reduces firm growth.
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19Appendix: Data description and data sources
Data source:
All data used in the paper is from the Ugandan  Industrial  Enterprise  Survey [see Reinikka  & Svensson
(1999)  for details].  The survey  was initiated  by the World  Bank and was implemented  during  the period
January-June  1998 by the UMA (an employers'  association).  The sampling frame was based on an
Industrial  census from 1996 and confined  to five general industrial  categories  (commercial  agriculture,
agro-processing,  other manufacturing,  construction  and tourism). The five sectors could be  further
classified  into 14 three-digit  ISIC-categories.  Based  on number  of enterprises,  the five sectors  constituted
52 % of the private sector, and almost 80 % of employment  in 1996.  The chosen sample size was 250
establishments.  Within these five industrial categories, commercial agriculture made up  26 %  of
employment,  agro-processing  28 %, other manufacturing  32 %, construction 12 %  and tourism  2 %.
Balancing  the importance  of the different  industrial  categories  at present  with the likely  importance  in the
future, the initial plan prescribed selecting  50 establishments  in commercial  agriculture, 50 in agro-
processing,  100 in other  manufacturing,  25 in construction  and 25 in tourism.  Five geographical  regions
were covered  in the sample  (Kampala,  Jinja/Iganga,  Mbale/Tororo,  Mukono,  and Mbarara).  These  regions
constitute more than 70 percent of total employment.  Three general criteria governed the choice of
procedure  in selecting  the sample  from the eligible establishments.  First, the sample should be at least
reasonably  representative  of the population  of establishments  in the specified  industrial  categories.  Second,
the establishments  surveyed should account for a  substantial  share of national output in each of the
industrial  categories.  Third, the sample should  be sufficiently  diverse  in terms of firm size, to enable
empirical  analysis  on the effects  of firm  size. To account  for these  three considerations,  a stratified  random
sample  was chosen  using  employment  shares  as weights.  The final sample surveyed  constituted  243 firms,
and was  fairly  similar  to the initially  selected  stratified  sample  (with  respect  to location  and size).
Data description:
growth:  Sales  growth  over the period 1995-1997,  defined  as [log(Sales  in 1997)  -log(Sales  in 1995)]/2.
bribe:  Reported  bribe in Uganda  Shillings.  Bribe payments  were reported  under the following  question,
"Many business  people have told us that firms are often required  to make informal payments  to public
officials  to deal with customs,  taxes, licenses,  regulations,  services,  etc. Can you estimate  what a firm in
your  line of business  and of similar  size  and characteristics  typically  pays each year?"
bribeiv:  Average  bribe  payment  at the location-industry  level.
tax:  Reported  tax payment  in Uganda  Shillings  (all types of taxes)
taxiv:  Average  tax payment  at the location-industry  level.
sales95:  Gross  sales  in Uganda  Shillings  (1995).
foreign:  Foreign  ownership  (in %).
export:  Binary  variable  taking  the value  I if the firm exports,  0 otherwise.
lsales95:  Logarithm  of sales95
age:  Age  of firm
20TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variables  Mean  Observations
(Std. Dev. in
L_________  parentheses  ____
Growth  0.111  189
____  ___  ____  __  __  (.347)
Bribe  0.013  166
(.024)
Tax  0.085  191
sales95 (in 000 USD)  1669  197
(6181)  _
Foreign  24.1  243
(39.5)




Bribe  -0.043  1
Tax  -0.088  -0.032  1
Lsale  -0.019  -0.144  0.172  1
Lage  -0.105  -0.136  -0.043  0.180  1
Foreign  .0143  -0.091  0.327  0.331  -0.122
Trade  0.165  0.064  0.076  0.430  0.028  0.378  1
21TABLE 2: EFFECT OF BRIBERY & TAXATION ON GROWTH, BASIC RELATIONSHIP
Dependent Variable: GROWTH
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS
Bribe  -1.249  -1.100  -1.166
(.903)  (.917)  (.949)
Tax  -0.285  -0.478  -0.495
(.247)  (.248)  (.219)
lsales95  0.002  -0.007  -0.018
(.011)  (.012)  (.013)
log(age)  -0.052  -0.039  -0.038
(.043)  (.040)  (.046)




Cons  0.224  0.357  0.522'
2_________________  (.239)  (.251)  (.254)
R
2 0.02  0.05  0.08
Observations  126  126  123
Standard errors in parentheses;  all regressions use Huber-White correction for heteroskedasticity, allowing
for clustering by location-industry.
*  Significant at the 10 percent level.
**  Significant at the five percent level.
22TABLE 3: EFFECT OF BRIBERY AND TAXATION ON GROWTH: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE
ESTIMATION
Dependent Variable: GROWTH
(1)  (2)  [(3)
Method  IV  IV  IV
Bribeiv  -3.320"  -3.255  -3.605
(1.558)  (1.688)  (1.688)
Taxiv  -1.342  -1.545  -1.696
(.638)  (.723)  (.715)
Lsales95  0.008  -0.006  -0.017
(.018)  (.016)  (.016)
Log(age)  -0.063  -0.045  -0.050
(.043)  (.040)  (.046)




Cons  0.249  0.450  0.624
(.340)  (.329)  (.336)
Observations  126  126  175
Standard errors in parentheses; all regressions use Huber-White correction for heteroskedasticity, allowing
for clustering by location-industry.
*  Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the five percent level.
The  instrumental  variables  were  generated  by  regressing  bribery/tax  rates  on  their  industry-location
averages, with all second stage controls included as covariates.
23TABLE 4: EFFECT OF BRIBERY AND TAXATION ON GROWTH, OUTLIERS EXCLUDED
Dependent Variable: GROWTH








Isales95  -0.012  -0.025
(.009)  (.016)
log(age)  -0.029  -0.046
(.027)  (.030)
Foreign  0.001  0.0013
(.0007)  (.0009)
Trade  0.050  0.078
(.045)  (048)
Cons  0.397  0.748
(.1I59)  .303)
B.2 ~~~~0.11  _  _  _  _  _
Observations  114  119
Standard errors in parentheses; all regressions use Huber-White correction for heteroskedasticity,  allowing
for clustering by location-industry.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
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